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Introduction 
 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) and Leopold Ranke (1795–1886) are often considered to 
be among the founding fathers of the tradition of German historicism. Authors like Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1901), Friedrich Meinecke (1936) and Georg Iggers (1968) have identified in Herder 
and Ranke’s thought central ideas that connect them to later historicist positions. For example, 
for both authors, historical phenomena have intrinsic value due to their individuality; the good 
in the human-historical world is necessarily plural; strong normative implications attach to 
diversity; and while all values depend on broad historical processes, it is necessarily illegitimate 
and suspect to endeavor determining a priori standards of truth and historical progress. The 
historicist interpretation generally concludes that, because of these claims, Herder and Ranke 
must have been committed to historical relativism. 
 
In this paper I explain why this conclusion is incorrect. Crucial to my argument is Herder and 
Ranke’s “theology of history” (Löwith 1949). In the literature defending historicist 
interpretations, its systematic importance has not been properly documented. I claim that it was 
only within their theology of history that Herder and Ranke appreciated the historical, 
individual, and diverse.i Their theology of history ensured that Herder and Ranke approached 
the diverse and particular from a monist starting-point and with the intent to point out the 
ultimate harmony of history.  
 
In the first two sections, I start from the theological foundations that Herder and Ranke took to 
confer upon history its intrinsic value and existential significance. In the third section, I sketch 
how they sought to order historical material in larger harmonious wholes with the aim of 
providing a structure for universal history. In this way I aim to establish that Herder and Ranke 
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were not guilty of some of the crudest versions of the “problem of relativism” or the “crisis of 
historicism.” In the final section, I explore in more detail the views of Herder and Ranke on 
themes that are often considered relativistic. It is indeed remarkable how many of the relativistic 
themes identified by Maria Baghramian (in the history of philosophy) and Martin Kusch (in 
contemporary debates) seem present in Herder and Ranke (Baghramian 2004, 50–82; Kusch 
2016, 107–108).ii Nevertheless, I aim to show that even regarding these themes, the positions 
of Herder and Ranke strongly diverged from later historicist positions. I conclude that Herder 
and Ranke should not be interpreted as relativists.iii 
 
1. Herder on Revelation, History, and Faith 
 
Herder’s This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity: Contribution to the 
Many Contributions of the Century (hereafter TTPH) was published in 1774 (PW 272–358). 
This short treatise with its fierce polemic against contemporaneous philosophy of historyiv has 
often been considered a foundational text of German historicism (e.g. Beiser 2011, 132). In the 
same year, Herder published two other works, both of a theological character: a collection of 
letters An Prediger (To Preachers), and an exegesis of the Old Testament, Älteste Urkunde des 
Menschengeschlechts (Oldest Document of the Human Race) (FHA 9/1, 67–138, FHA 5, 179–
660; Menze 2000, 11). In the latter, Herder puts forward the thesis that an original revelation 
pervades all of creation. The former presents religious faith as a universal psychological 
capacity and as part of the human condition. Taken together, these texts provide the foundation 
on which Herder relied in his 1774 attempt at presenting a unified vision of universal history. 
 
In TTPH, Herder confronts the epistemological difficulties relating to this attempt (FHA 4, 32–
42, 81–89). Furthermore, he relentlessly criticizes the tendency of his Enlightenment 
contemporaries to see their own historical standpoints as absolutely privileged, and to consider 
their value-terms as universal tools fit for measuring historical progress.v In order to properly 
assess this intervention by Herder into eighteenth-century philosophy of history, it is crucial to 
also take into sufficient account his own alternative to a one-sided progressivism. Herder’s 
alternative is a providential model according to which history is unified as one development. 
Herder claims that this development should be understood “in a higher sense than people have 
imagined it,” and that it is extremely difficult to pin down (PW 298, FHA 4, 41vi). Nonetheless, 
he is confident that history will appear as “God’s course through the nations” once it is 
approached from the right perspective (PW 349, FHA 4, 88). For Herder, identifying this 
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perspective is a religious task. In this section, I show how Herder’s philosophy of history builds 
on his theology.  
 
In Älteste Urkunde, Herder puts forward the thesis that God is omnipresent in nature and history 
(FHA 5, 298). Accordingly, he understands positive religions as ways of capturing a primordial 
revelation from different historical or geographical standpoints (305 ff.; cf. Gaier 1988, 73–74). 
This revelation is connected to God’s act of creation and handed down to humanity in the form 
of what Herder calls the “Schöpfungshieroglyphe” (hieroglyph of creation). According to 
Herder, this hieroglyph is God’s primordial revelation to humanity in a seven-step symbol or 
“Denkbild” (FHA 5, 281; cf. Häfner 1995, 216–221). This Denkbild communicates God’s act 
of creation in a form that prefigures the first written religious documents (FHA 5, 267–282). 
The hieroglyph structures the seven days of creation in the following way (see fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1: The seven positions of the Schöpfungshieroglyphe (Graczyk 2014, 74; SWS 6, 
292, FHA 5, 271). 
 
The first book of Genesis is the paradigmatic example of how this Denkbild is conserved in 
narrative form. Positive and natural religion thus coincide. But Herder attempts to establish at 
length that the hieroglyph informs all other ancient religions as well (305–476). Furthermore, 
traces of the Schöpfungshieroglyphe can be recognized in literary traditions, in nature, and in 
world history.  
 
One implication of the hieroglyph-theory is that the Biblical period takes central stage as the 
origin of human culture (FHA 4, 14; Hinrichs 1954, 61). God instructed humanity in its 
childhood; the hieroglyph’s primordial revelation contained the seeds out of which all of 
humanity’s history, culture, and education developed (FHA 5, 297–301, FHA 4, 89). Historical 
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explanation thus exhibits how a thing developed out of its holy origin.vii This development is 
dynamic and may present revelation in a variety of shapes: “God is revealed to the human race 
at many times and in various ways … God’s revelations … were seeds, concealed and sown in 
various ways, which contained much that was to develop only with the passing of time and with 
the extensive passing of time. The Bible consists of the unfolding of developing times” (Herder 
1993, 213, FHA 9/1, 83). Because of this world-historical significance of the Bible, the history 
of religion becomes Herder’s prime pedagogical antidote to theological rationalism (84, 131–
132). The Bible’s images and examples convey the infinite in the particular, whereas general 
philosophical concepts merely present abstractions (104). 
 
Another implication of the hieroglyph-theory is that a divine perspective exists in which the 
totality of world history is grasped (FHA 4, 35, 83). In this life, this perspective can never be 
ours. And God only reveals himself in forms adjusted to particular historical contexts (18, 48 
f.). Furthermore, God does not intervene in history directly or supernaturally. God acts through 
all of nature, and it is the natural development of history which shows that “deity … takes effect 
so entirely poured forth, uniform, and invisible through all its works” (PW 305, FHA 4, 48). 
Herder’s God is immanent in all of nature and history and organizes its interconnectedness.  
 
Due to the presence of God in history, an imaginative and engaged perspective on all of the 
experiences of the human soul throughout history can provide us with hints of providence. The 
senses and feelings may be our guides here: for Herder, the education of the child functions as 
a model for God’s instruction of humanity (FHA 5, 250, FHA 9/1, 102). Faith is related to the 
senses and to feeling. In Herder’s psychology, feeling is a vital aspect of human cognition (FHA 
9/1, 84–86, FHA 5, 246–257). Herder thus expounds in An Prediger that sensuous faith should 
be cultured in the right way—through images and history—rather than dismissed as 
unphilosophical (FHA 9/1, 100–104, 131; cf. Crowe 2009, 268–269). Furthermore, Herder is 
convinced that history will appear to the devoted historian as “the stage of a guiding intention 
on earth!, even if we should not be able to see the final intention, the stage of the deity, even if 
only through openings and ruins of individual scenes” (PW 299, FHA 4, 42). Herder appreciates 
the historicity of every individual because he is determined to find hints of this guiding intention 
in all of history. It is only within this image of creation that individual historical periods have 
an intrinsic worth. As Herder insists: “Only the height of revelation offers sight” (FHA 9/1, 
127). 
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While the difficulty of decipherment is an important connotation of “hieroglyph,” the 
Schöpfungshieroglyphe clearly does not solely refer to the limits of human knowledge. In 
TTPH, the seven-step structure of the hieroglyph actually informs the structure of the world-
historical development (Pfaff 1983, 409, 415–416). The clearest example is how Herder 
presents the succession of ancient peoples: the oriental patriarchs occupy the first of the seven 
positions of the hieroglyph (see fig. 1); the historical development then splits up into an 
Egyptian (2.) and a Phoenician (3.) position, and returns to one position (4.) with the Greek. 
Herder is less clear, however, how the more recent periods of world history fit into the second 
run of the hieroglyph. Furthermore, in TTPH, Herder refrains from confirming explicitly that 
the course of world history is hieroglyphic. Apart from the epistemological restrictions on 
philosophy of history, theological limitations also play a role here: the course of history should 
exhibit its intelligibility by itself; Herder is careful that his theology of history does not appear 
“fanatic.”viii Still, principally the hieroglyph provides Herder with a logic for  
 
binding together the most disparate scenes without confusing them … showing how 
they relate to one another, grow out of one another, lose themselves in one another, 
all of them taken individually only moments, only through the progression means 
to purposes—what a sight!, what a noble application of human history!, what 
encouragement to hope, to act, to believe, even where one sees nothing or not 
everything. (PW 299, FHA 4, 42)  
 
These objectives are not merely important for a theory of history. Rather, they directly inform 
religious practice (65). Furthermore, the seven-step structure of the hieroglyph provides a 
principle of divine organization that is qualitatively different from the imposition of abstract 
categories of moral progress. This is because Herder sees the hieroglyph as a divine image; a 
Denkbild for human sensuousness and imagination which connects different elements into an 
organic whole (FHA 5, 281, 297–298; Graczyk 2014, 74–76). To sum up, Herder bases his 
alternative model of history in TTPH on a sensualistic conception of faith combined with the 
view that revelation permeates all of history.   
 
Finally, the hieroglyph-theory also helps to understand Herder’s assessment of the present, and 
thus of the task of the historian. Herder states in Älteste Urkunde that on the seventh day, 
Sabbath, God provided humanity with the education on which all its “Bildung” and happiness 
depends (FHA 5, 285, 289). The seventh step in TTPH’s structure of world history most 
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probably represents Herder’s enlightened present (Pfaff 1983, 416). Herder concludes that it is 
time that humanity turns towards history in order to educate itself and intimate its fate: 
 
If our age is nobly useful in any respect at all then it is “its lateness, its height, its 
prospect!” … Philosopher, if you want to honor and benefit your century’s 
situation—the book of preceding history lies before you!, locked with seven seals, 
a miracle book full of prophecy—the end of days has reached you!, read! (PW 337, 
FHA 4, 85) 
 
2. Ranke’s Theological Legitimation of History 
 
Almost sixty years later, Leopold Ranke aimed to liberate the study of history from idealistic 
philosophy, and to legitimate it as an autonomous “Wissenschaft.” He searched for a principle 
that would explain the tendency of history to oppose the aspirations of philosophy. He 
summarized it as follows: “History turns with sympathy to the individual … it likes to attach 
itself to the conditions of appearance … it insists on the validity of particular interest. It 
recognizes the beneficent, the existing, and opposes change which negates the existing. It 
recognizes even in error its share in truth” (TP 11, AWN 4, 77). Ranke was straightforward 
about what legitimates this tendency: “It is not necessary for us to prove at length that the eternal 
dwells in the individual. This is the religious foundation on which our efforts rest. We believe 
that there is nothing without God, and nothing lives except through God” (TP 11, AWN 4, 77). 
No further external motivation is necessary for studying history (79). An independent value is 
ascribed to all historical material.  
 
History can be studied on its own terms because it manifests divine benevolence all by itself 
(Meinecke 1942, 129–130). The individual appearance has worth because it contains higher 
principles; the finite because it contains the infinite; the concrete because it contains the abstract 
(AWN 4, 77). Therefore, universal history is significant not just as the scientific ideal of 
reaching complete truth but also as a religious accomplishment. The ultimate aim of the 
historian is to aid humankind in its quest for redemption by uncovering history’s hidden 
meaning (Berding 2005, 43; Gadamer 1960, 215; Hinrichs 1954, 141). Ranke too presents this 
aim by referring to a divine hieroglyph:  
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In all of history God dwells, lives and can be recognized. Every deed gives 
testimony of Him, every moment preaches His name; but most of all … His 
presence is plain in the connection of history in the large. God stands there like a 
holy hieroglyph whose most outer form is apprehended and preserved, perhaps so 
that He is not lost to more perceptive future centuries … No matter how it goes and 
succeeds, let us do our part to unveil this holy hieroglyph! In this way too we serve 
God, in this way we are also priests and teachers. (TP 4ix, Ranke 1949, 18)  
 
For Ranke, any historical appearance has its own relation to the divine. In this way, the infinite 
can be found in its individual character. Thus the historical particular is autonomous from 
philosophical speculation about timeless ideas and linear progress. For Ranke the infinite is also 
captured, however, in the connections between all ages. In this case, the individual carries value 
to the extent that it delivers a contribution to the whole. Hence the value of the individual is 
determined only indirectly: the historian attempts to situate the individual in the totality of world 
history (AWN 4, 297; Krieger 1977, 15-19; Meinecke 1942, 131–132). But this totality itself 
remains an ideal: “God alone knows world history. We recognize the contradictions—‘the 
harmonies,’ as an Indian poet says, ‘known to the Gods, but unknown to men;’ we can only 
divine, only approach from a distance” (TP 15, AWN 4, 83). 
 
Ranke’s general organization of world history seems structured along a vertical and a horizontal 
plane. On the vertical plane, there is an immediate relation between God and every individual 
epoch (TP 2, AWN 4, 60). That is to say, in every epoch, there is a direct “upwards” relation 
towards God, and God looks down upon every epoch, and sees that it is good. On the horizontal 
plane, the epochs stand in various relations to each other. Ranke assumes that the succession of 
historical periods is identical with the divine order of creation (Ranke 1949, 102, 519; Meinecke 
1942, 149). Thus Ranke too posits a providential course of world history. 
 
Herder frames the relationship between individuality and development in a similar way when 
he states that “no thing in the whole of God’s realm … is only a means—everything is means 
and end simultaneously” (PW 310, FHA 4, 54). Whereas it is legitimate to assess the function 
of individual periods, all periods preserve an intrinsic purposefulness. Historical periods are 
situated in immediate relation to God vertically, and ordered in a providential sequence 
horizontally. Furthermore, Herder likewise identifies the providential sequence with the general 
divine order of creation:  
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If the residential house reveals a “divine image” … how not the history of its 
resident? The former only decoration!, picture in a single act, view! The latter an 
“endless drama of scenes!, an epic of God’s through all millennia, parts of the 
world, and human races, a thousand-formed fable full of a great meaning!” (PW 
336, translation modified, FHA 4, 82–83) 
 
In this endless drama, scenes carry meaning both in themselves and in relation to each other. 
But in addition, they also all together strive for a final and transcendent end. The individuality 
of phenomena is always the product of specific historical developments. Yet the notion of 
development invariably points beyond the individual phenomenon, and allows one to assess its 
value in terms of its effect, its contribution (32). Ultimately, historical significance is defined 
in terms of outcome (Gadamer 1960, 207). And in their visions of history and salvation, Herder 
and Ranke formulate expectations regarding the future that lie outside of history (contra 
Koselleck 1975, 674–675; Sikka 2011, 116–125; cf. Löwith 1949, 5–6).  
 
Another way to frame the relation between individuality and development, therefore, is with 
reference to two onto-theological positions: the panentheism according to which God is present 
everywhere in creation, and the more traditional Christian position that places salvation (and 
hence the ultimate meaning of history) beyond history. Both Herder and Ranke relied on 
versions of panentheism in their arguments for individuality. But regarding the future, the 
principle of development demands a thicker metaphysics: a final end must remain unreached, 
so that the future may preserve a certain promise. This results in a tension between evaluating 
the particular from the perspective of the divine and from the perspective of a final end. Pointing 
at the unknown nature of the latter relieves this tension to some extent. In the next section, I 
sketch some of the concrete structures of world history that Herder and Ranke relied on in their 
attempts at reconciling these conflicting tendencies. 
 
3. Individuals and Analogies in World History 
 
Previous research has observed that Ranke “applied to history the antinomy characteristic of 
his romantic age: the idea of an individual reality which was at one and the same time unique 
in itself and, like other individuals, a manifestation of a universal principle” (Krieger 1977, 16). 
This “antinomy” had played a major role in German Enlightenment thought ever since Leibniz 
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had put forward his conception of the monad, and already Ernst Cassirer examined how Herder 
incorporated Leibniz’ idea of individuality in his philosophy of history (Cassirer 1916, 116–
121). In this section I will indicate how Herder and Ranke dealt with the antinomy of individual 
and totality in their accounts of universal history.  
 
Key to their theorizing is that the “universal principle” is not abstract but a holistic whole, a 
“higher-order individual” (Cassirer 1916, 119; Heinz 1994, 83). This is because the historian’s 
attempt to find unity in history is supposed to be distinct from the philosopher’s projection of 
linear progress onto history. Thus, the universal must not be deduced out of higher principles 
and projected onto history. Rather, the universal is expressed in the particular, and presents 
itself to the historian who approaches the particulars of history from the right stance (FHA 4, 
32–33; AWN 4, 78, 83, 87–88). Furthermore, the historian, in connecting different ages or 
nations, must not rely on unifying notions that are specific and local. Instead, the 
interconnectedness and meaning of world history is revealed to the historian by pious faith and 
divination. It follows that the organization of history can merely be indicated by analogies, and 
not be demonstrated from principles. After all, God is present in history (only) in the form of a 
hieroglyph. Herder and Ranke both attempted to intimate God’s plan and stressed its ultimate 
indiscernibility. 
 
Only by analogies can the direction of history’s providential development be hypothetically 
identified. Both Herder and Ranke use the image of a river to convey that the course of history 
does not depend on predetermined principles; history is “moving more like a river which in its 
own way determines its course” (TP 22, AWN 2, 62). Other aspects that play a role in this 
analogy involve the source and the mouth of the river of history. Ranke, for instance, assumes 
that this river flows from an “active source of life,” an “existence kindred to God,” and that it 
searches for “the world-sea” (Ranke 1949, 110). And Herder describes “how it sprang forth 
from a little source, grows, breaks off there, begins here, ever meanders, and bores further and 
deeper—but always remains water!, river current!, drop always only drop, until it plunges into 
the ocean” (PW 299, FHA 4, 41). In this depiction, too, the image of the river suggests that 
history started with a Fall from a source and is ultimately directed at salvation. Of course, this 
future “end” is far removed from the present and closed off from philosophical speculation 
(101). But it does not leave the future entirely open either.  
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According to the tree-analogy, history grows out of a seed which, after falling in the earth, first 
develops in its depths (11). In Herder’s TTPH, ancient history proceeds from Patriarchal roots 
along an Egyptian, Phoenician, and Greek stem, and then branches out due to Roman expansion 
politics (31). As already became apparent in the context of how the Schöpfungshieroglyphe 
guides world history, Herder remains ambiguous about (early) modernity. Still, the tree-analogy 
implies that the present’s high and thin branches allow for a better view of the whole (70, 84, 
95). It also suggests that new human processes of development may start from the tree’s seeds, 
and that cyclical movements in history co-exist with natural development (42–43; Meinecke 
1936, 410). When Ranke speaks of history as a tree, he stresses that the leaves are all 
interconnected through their common root (Hinrichs 1954, 145; but cf. FHA 4, 56). The tree 
represents the beauty of diversity; the plurality of nations that are isolated and still ultimately 
all connected. In TTPH, the image of the tree appears in tandem with the “Lebensalter” (life-
stages) of humanity (41). This analogy, between how one human being and humanity as a whole 
develop, shows paradigmatically how individuality and totality are reconciled (16, FHA 9/1, 
84). The Lebensalter of the “macro-Anthropos” provide a concrete way of conceptualizing 
humanity’s historical development (Heinz 1994, 83). History as described by the analogy is 
thus progressive—humanity matures, ages, and produces offspring–but the standards for 
measuring such progress differ with each life-stage.  
 
4. Relativistic Themes 
 
In Der Historismus und seine Probleme (Historicism and its Problems) Ernst Troeltsch claims 
that Ranke managed to avoid pessimism only “by holding on to admittedly pretty obscure left-
overs of the Christian faith concerning revelation and salvation” (Troeltsch 1922, 123). In his 
assessment of the foundational status of Herder’s 1774 TTPH for German historicism, Frederick 
Beiser similarly adds the following caveat:  
 
There is also a shadowy side to Herder's legacy, which bestowed upon the historicist 
tradition not only central themes but also basic problems. The worst problem was 
relativism, i.e., how there could be universal standards if all values are cultural and 
historical. While Herder clearly sees this problem and struggles to avoid it, he offers 
nothing toward its solution but religious faith, an appeal to providence. It was a 
desperate strategy; but also the precedent for Humboldt, Ranke and Droysen. 
(Beiser 2011, 132)  
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Beiser and Troeltsch exemplify a general pattern of theorizing about relativism and historicism. 
According to this pattern, historicists inevitably face the problem of relativism; and every 
historicist needs to adopt strategies for countering this relativism.x  
 
This paper defends two connected claims regarding this supposedly necessary connection 
between historicism and the problem of relativism. First, Herder and Ranke’s theology of 
history provides the monist basis which underlies their view of history. Thus Herder and Ranke 
were no relativists. Second, it is misleading to interpret their theology of history as a “counter-
strategy” against relativism. Because of Herder and Ranke’s theology of history the problem of 
relativism never became pressing in the first place.  
 
As I have emphasized in the above sections, Herder and Ranke were strongly optimistic about 
the worth of all human history. This optimism was inspired by their theology of history. It may 
have come to appear as a “desperate strategy” to us. But rather than being “left-overs of the 
Christian faith concerning revelation and salvation,” this theology of history was essential to 
Herder’s and Ranke’s conceptions of history. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explain 
how Herder’s and Ranke’s theses on prima-facie relativistic themes—historicity, individuality, 
equal validity, and impartiality—are best understood as expressions of religious faith rather 
than as problems that need to be countered by faith. These theses strikingly diverge from what 
most historical relativists would later claim.xi  
 
Historicity 
While, according to Herder and Ranke, events and societies should indeed be approached as 
the products of history, still, all historical phenomena are primordially the products of God. 
And although this dependence upon God’s provenience should not lead to strict determinism, 
and God does not directly interfere in history, it does not leave historical phenomena merely 
contingent either (cf. FHA 4, 48; Ranke 1828, 198). Rather, concrete historical phenomena 
express the infinite.  
 
For Herder, the history of human culture is a history of God’s education of humanity. Every 
moral character, no matter how different from ours, expresses a stage in this education, and is 
thus human and moral. And when the character of a certain people does appear immoral to us, 
theodicy steps in: Herder praises God’s diverse methods for the education of the human soul 
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and reprimands his contemporaries’ shortsightedness (FHA 4, 15, 51). Furthermore, Herder 
defends practices that were perceived as immoral by his contemporaries in at least three ways, 
all of which refer to the divine dimension of world history. First, he places practices within their 
historical context, and explains why they appear less unethical when appropriately situated (53). 
This move involves a critique of Herder’s contemporaries’ tendency to rely exclusively on their 
own value-system. Herder instead claims that God’s wisdom is reflected in the immensely 
diverse field of human-historical possibilities (106). Second, Herder states that some evils are 
necessary for historical development, or to make room for virtues that would otherwise not have 
been possible (36, 87–88). Finally, Herder refers to our cognitive limitations with respect to 
“contingency, fate, divinity”: we are ultimately incapable of evaluating God’s ways regarding 
world history in its entirety. This is why it happens that frequently we cannot, from our 
perspective, see beyond the seeming contingency of events (58).xii 
 
More generally, in their theodicies, Herder and Ranke unequivocally adhere to certain 
permanent core values. The history of humanity has a stable human subject across historical 
changes; it is this subject which takes on diverse human shapes.xiii Ranke even allows “certain 
unchangeable eternal main ideas, for instance those of morality”—even though he denies that 
we can use these ideas to measure moral progress (TP 21–22, AWN 2, 61). 
 
Individuality and Incommensurability 
According to Herder and Ranke, the historian’s task is to trace the development of human 
practices, and to understand them in their own context as well as in comparison with others. As 
a result of this genetic and comparative procedure, some aspects of these practices appear 
completely individual and in fact extremely difficult to compare with anything else.xiv An 
important implication of this undertaking seems to be that cultures are understood as isolated 
wholes and that their values are centered on their “core.” This would make intercultural 
understanding very difficult at best.  
 
And yet, according to Herder and Ranke’s theology of history, God thinks of all individualities 
as forming an ultimate harmony. The historian in turn emulates this ideal in searching for the 
interconnectedness of universal history, and by attempting to delineate a unified world-
historical process. Thus Herder confidently asserts, against Voltaire’s critique of the Middle 
Ages, that this period was simultaneously “only like itself,” an “individual condition of the 
world!” as well as striving “towards a greater whole” (PW 207, FHA 4, 51). And Ranke states: 
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“The historian must … perceive the difference between the individual epochs, in order to 
observe the inner necessity of the sequence” (TP 22, AWN 2, 62). Herder and Ranke were 
confident that the sequence of history, just like the course of nature, can ultimately be justified 
in terms of theodicy. History’s providential organization is visible to the same extent as the 
order of nature is visible: like the book of nature, history is hieroglyphic, but (ultimately) 
readable. The historian’s task is to connect letters and words into a meaningful sequence where 
“everything occurs in its proper place” (PW 342, FHA 4, 90). The ideal historian would “learn 
to see the value of ages that we now despise”; “show us a plan where we formerly found 
confusion”; and present “prospects of a higher than human this-worldly existence” (PW 342, 
translation modified, FHA 4, 89–90). 
 
Equal Value and Equal Rights 
Probably the most notorious aspect of relativism is the idea that all cultural frames are of equal 
value. This idea can take many forms; here it is useful to distinguish between the metaphysical 
claim that all value-systems are (in fact) equal, and the methodological imperative to treat them 
as if they were all of equal value.xv Generally, the idea is considered to be motivated by the 
relativistic reasoning that since there is no absolute standpoint from which cultures can be 
ranked, they are all of equal worth. To this reasoning, anti-relativists respond with the “self-
refutation argument,” which takes the form of the question: if there is no absolute standpoint, 
then from which perspective could we possibly assert that all cultures are equal?  
 
Ranke would have no problems at all in answering this question. But this is because he does 
not share one of the relativist’s premises: “I picture the deity—since no time lies before it–as 
surveying all of historic mankind in its totality and finding it everywhere of equal value” (TP 
22, AWN 2, 62–63). For Ranke, God’s perspective is the standpoint from which equal value is 
distributed. In modern epistemological terms, this is an absolutist move. In theological terms, 
it refers to the limitations of our finite condition and to the belief that, unlike us, God is able to 
appreciate every aspect of creation. Nonetheless, from his theological claim involving an 
absolute standpoint, Ranke does infer the methodological imperative to treat all of historical 
humanity in the same manner. For he says in the same passage: “Before God all generations of 
men appear endowed with equal rights, and this is how the historian should view matters” (TP 
22, AWN 2, 63). These “equal rights” do not demand that the historian actually sees all 
generations as of equal value—for Ranke, this is humanly impossible: human knowers will 
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always have their own standpoint as well. What is more, Ranke himself clearly ranked nations, 
and even denied some the status of culture (85). 
 
Herder’s view is slightly different: He dismisses the idea of a state of nature, and claims that 
every human way of life is cultural. Moreover, he does not adhere to the idea of the equal value 
of cultures (Spencer 2012, 110). But like Ranke, he does consider all human cultures to have 
an autonomous value, and to deserve equal rights in historical research. And these assertions 
are made from God’s point of view.  
 
Impartiality and Empathy 
The methodological implications of the notion of “equal rights” deserve separate treatment. 
Ranke’s principle of impartiality has come to stand for the idea that historians should 
“extinguish” themselves so that the objects of historical enquiry can “speak for themselves” 
(Beiser 2011, 277).xvi Ranke intended to make historiography more objective. Yet in the debates 
on historicism and relativism, this ideal of objectivity has been identified with the inability to 
make any value judgments. Due to the attempt to eclipse all subjective elements of judgment, 
critical judgment becomes impossible. Herder’s notion of “Einfühlung” (empathy) has been 
criticized for the same reason. By fully entering the other’s perspective, the historian would 
become interminably tolerant.xvii Nothing seems left to say except that every party is right 
according to their own standards.  
 
In reality, Herder and Ranke did consider it possible for historians to evaluate their material. It 
is useful to distinguish between two forms of moral judgment that are important in interpreting 
Herder and Ranke. The first form consists of the regular human capacity to criticize injustice. 
In Herder’s case this happens according to the core values derived from human nature; in 
Ranke’s case according to the “eternal main ideas of morality.” The second form of moral 
judgment is of a higher sort. Here the historian recognizes the divine nature of human historical 
existence. These two forms can both be found in Herder’s historiographical practice (e.g. FHA 
4, 53). Furthermore, Ranke states that the impartial historian approaches any conflict by 
viewing both sides “on their own ground, in their own environment, so to speak, in their own 
particular inner state. We must understand them before we judge them” (TP 14, AWN 4, 81). 
Impartiality thus stands explicitly in the service of evaluation (Beiser 2011, 278–279). 
Furthermore, complete impartiality has to remain an ideal (Berding 2005, 49). Nevertheless, 
the historian is meant to emulate a higher ideal of passing judgment. Ranke asks: “We can 
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identify error, but where is there no error? This will not lead us to condemn what exists. Next 
to the good we recognize evil; but this evil is human too” (AWN 4, 81). 
 
To sum up, Herder and Ranke both identify the following steps in the historian’s judgment. 
First, they recognize that we are all situated and prejudiced. Impartiality and empathy are 
consequently meant to broaden our horizon so that we expand our understanding beyond the 
received opinions. Yet this methodological ideal does not lead us to grasping the equal validity 
of all of historical humanity. We do pass moral judgment after our investigations. Nevertheless, 
in the end, we have to attempt to recognize the human character and the function in history’s 
providential course even of amoral practices. Thus ultimately Ranke and Herder both seek to 
treat worldly evil in a merciful way. This ideal of mercy stems from the belief that God will 
forgive. For God, the whole of humanity has (equal) value, even if certain periods are obviously 
less virtuous or pious than others. The historian will never be able to forgive perceived wrongs 
as mercifully as does God. Still, Herder and Ranke show tolerance towards historical and 
cultural others precisely because they expect to find absolute value spread out across different 
forms of human life. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In their philosophies of history, Herder and Ranke share a providential conception of world 
history, and a view of redemption as the uncertain or open telos for humanity. This theology of 
history informs many aspects of their work. It provides historical individualities with an 
autonomous significance. And it simultaneously promises that the providential character of 
universal history can at least be intimated. Finally, it makes the task of the historian akin to that 
of the priest. 
 
As a result, the starting-points from which Herder and Ranke approached themes like 
historicity, individuality, (equal) validity, and impartiality were different from how 
philosophers around 1900 assessed historicist theses.xviii Accordingly, I interpret the positions 
of Herder and Ranke on these themes not as aspects of a relativistic position, nor as strategies 
for countering a slide into relativism. Herder and Ranke’s philosophy of history had a monist 
foundation in theology, and their theses on the value of history show that they were no 
relativists. Rather, when Herder and Ranke searched the value of all of history, and to judge 
mercifully, they performed a religious task. This task was to uncover the ultimate meaning of 
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history, and to preserve partial hints of the divine for future generations. It was a project that 
“we” later abandoned. But for Herder and Ranke, it was not a “desperate strategy” against 
relativism, and it was based on more than mere “obscure left-overs of Christian faith.” 
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xi I cannot provide the ultimate comprehensive definition of historical relativism and so I 
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